All clubs and GFA members are urged to report all occurrences and incidents promptly, as and when they occur, using the GFA’s occurrence reporting portal at glidingaustralia.org/Log-In/log-in-soar.html. This is always best done while all details are fresh in everyone's mind.
You can read the full SOAR report at tinyurl.com/ltmko56
Reports noted 'Under investigation' are based on preliminary information received and may contain errors. Any errors in this summary will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
Date: 3/2/2023
Region: NSWGA
Aircraft Type: ASW 27-18
Classification Level 2: Ground Operations
Under investigation. While towing the glider to the hangar, a wind gust (possibly a thermal) struck the glider causing it to dislodge from the tow equipment. The starboard wing impacted a runaway marker and the glider hit the tow vehicle. Significant damage was cause to the starboard control surface, the port flap, and vertical fin assembly.
Date: 5/2/2023
Region: VSA
Aircraft Type: ASW 28
Classification Level 2: Systems
What Happened
At the top of a competition launch, the pilot was unable to release the tow rope.
Analysis
The pilot chose to make a radio call to the tow pilot advising of the failure to release but did not use the tug callsign. After a few radio calls, the tow pilot eventually became aware of the situation and towed the glider back towards the aerodrome. After numerous attempts to release the tow rope, it did release. The pilot landed back on the aerodrome and inspected the release, but the release tested OK and the pilot was unable to determine the cause of the failure. The pilot took a relaunch and the released worked when used.
Safety Advice
As with all radio communications, broadcasts must identify the callsign of the station being called as well as the station calling. In this case the glider pilot did not know the tug callsign, so there was some initial confusion as to which of the four tugs was involved. Had the pilot conducted the standard release failure procedure and flown out to the left of the tow plane in accordance with standard procedures, they may have got the tow pilots attention earlier.
Date: 26/2/2023
Region: NSWGA
Aircraft Type: ASW 28
Classification Level 2: Systems
What Happened
At the top of the launch, the pilot was unable to release the tow rope and, following several unsuccessful attempts by the glider pilot, the tow pilot released the rope from the tow plane. The pilot landed safely.
Analysis
The pilot reported that the release had also failed during an aerotow a few weeks earlier (Refer to report S-2163), so a more thorough inspection was considered warranted. The release mechanism was removed from the sailplane and the inspector found a small stone lying loose in the nose under the release mechanism. As the stone was mobile, the inspector considered it was most likely that it would occasionally move into a position that prevented the release from being actuated. The stone was removed and there have been no further problems.
Date: 28/2/2023
Region: NSWGA
Aircraft Type: ASK21
Classification Level 2: Terrain Collisions
What Happened
Shortly after becoming airborne on an aerotow launch and at a height of about 80ft, the glider flew through turbulence causing the student pilot to hit his head on the canopy and inadvertently release the tow cable. The pilot reflexively lowered the nose and opened the airbrakes to conduct a short landing and contacted the ground hard. The glider rebounded into the air and again struck the ground hard in a nose down attitude. The pilot was uninjured, but the glider was extensively damaged around the nose wheel and forward of the rear instrument panel.
Analysis
The student pilot had planned to fly a solo soaring flight of one hour to qualify for the issue of a ?C? certificate qualification. The wind was north westerly at about 8 knots, gusting to 15 knots. The pilot had intended to fly the Club?s PW5, in which he had flown 27 flights. However, the supervising instructor suggested the K21 was more suited to the conditions, as it provided a more stable platform and was the aircraft in which the student had completed most of their training. The CFI reported that the student had flown 151 flights prior to the incident and had gone solo after 71 flights. The student had flown 36 solo flights before the incident, of which 27 flights were in the PW5. The student had trained with four instructors over 12 months, and usually flew about once a month for a week at a time. The student's current instructor regards him as a thorough and disciplined pilot who conducts comprehensive prefight checks with appropriate attention to options. He is very comfortable in the air, and flies in a safe and well considered manner. The investigation identified the crosswind from the left, and mild gusting as contributing factors. The groin strap was loose, but the lap and shoulder straps were tight. The student had their hand close to the release knob and was not holding it, but the sudden bump may have caused the pilot to grasp it. The CFI concluded that the incident was not the result of a PIO, but a reflexive response to aggressive but short-lived turbulence. The student?s action was inappropriate for a low-level launch failure, and the student acknowledged that they should have taken a second or two to assess the situation before reacting. The duty instructor supervising the launch stated that it appeared to be normal up until the point of turbulence, whereupon the glider was seen to sharply nose down and disappear below the line of sight on the sloping runway, and appear again, probably after the first contact with the ground and a bounce. The student will undergo further training, with the emphasis on decision making rather than an instinctive response in various emergency scenarios.
Safety Advice
Aerotow launch emergencies are not uncommon and form part of a pilot?s training. During launch the pilot must have a plan to address any emergency that may occur. Indeed, the pre-take-off checklist requires a pilot to consider their actions in the event of an emergency. In the case of a rope break or premature release from tow, the priority for the pilot is to lower the glider?s nose and adopt safe speed. The next action is to assess landing options and conduct a safe landing. Sudden and aggressive control movements in pitch must be avoided, especially when close to the ground. Coarse elevator control inputs are inconsistent with a safe transition from a stabilised approach into the flare and landing and will often result in a sudden and unrecoverable steep dive into the ground.
Date: 5/3/2023
Region: SAGA
Aircraft Type: ASK21
Classification Level 2: Ground Operations
What Happened
While towing the ASK-21 glider back to the hangar, the driver received a stop signal and applied the vehicle brakes. Unbeknown to the driver, the rigid towing bar had bent and was now rubbing on the glider?s rudder. Upon arriving at the hanger, the driver noticed the rudder had suffered some minor scratching from the bent towing bar.
Analysis
The rigid tow bar became bent when the towing combination, which was travelling above normal speed, was abruptly braked when the vehicle driver received a signal from the duty instructor to stop. The compressive force of deceleration resulted in the tow bar deforming. The cause of the incident was largely the result of a deterioration in judgment caused by prolonged exposure to a very hot day with multiple incidences of time in the sun repairing cables breaks. In addition, the tow vehicle driver was under some pressure to depart the airfield for a meeting in town and was in a hurry. Despite no significant damage resulting from this incident, there was a high probability that major damage could have resulted. The day?s operation was not unusual but was conducted in high temperatures common in that location at this time of year. During the day there were multiple launch stoppages due to cable breaks, with winch drivers remaining in the sun for prolonged periods. Both the glider pilot and the tow vehicle driver had driven the winch during the day. At completion of flying, the two gliders on the airstrip were to be moved to the hanger connected to vehicles via rigid towbars. The ASK-21 was towed at speed towards the hangar and was about to overtake the other glider when the Duty Instructor signalled stop to allow the other glider to enter the hangar first. The vehicle towing the ASK-21 stopped with enough force to cause the tow bar to deform while decelerating the glider. There was a brief exchange between the duty instructor and passenger of the tow vehicle, where it was resolved that the ASK-21 would be towed beyond the hangar to make room for the other glider. The driver then departed with the damaged tow bar causing an oscillation of the glider?s tail that was noticed by the Duty Instructor. The Duty Instructor again signalled the vehicle driver to stop but the driver did not see the signal and continued on their way. On arriving at the hangar the ASK-21 was unhooked and the driver and vehicle left the field immediately without further communication. After exiting the vehicle, the passenger noticed the deformation in the tow bar and conducted an inspection of the glider with the duty instructor. Apart from some abrasion, the glider did not suffer further damage. The CFI interviewed the persons involved and identified several failures: The winch drivers lacked self-awareness of their fatigued state. The vehicle driver was in a hurry to leave and drove too fast. The passenger in the vehicle towing the ASK-21, being similarly fatigued, did not identify the glider was being towed too fast. Neither the vehicle driver nor passenger maintained adequate situational awareness during the tow. It is not normal practice to overtake another glider under vehicle tow. Despite the investigation showing no significant damage had occurred to the glider, this incident could have easily resulted in substantial damage had there been greater contact between the rudder or tail plane and the vehicle or tow bar. Additionally, had the glider in question had a more ridged tow bar it may have transferred additional braking forces to the airframe of the glider.
Safety Advice
Fatigue High levels of fatigue cause reduced performance and productivity and increases the risk of accidents and injuries. Fatigue affects the ability to think clearly. As a result, people who are fatigued are unable to gauge their own level of impairment and are unaware that they are not functioning as well or as safely as they would be if they were not fatigued. People working in a fatigued state may place themselves and others at risk. Fatigue management is a shared responsibility between Clubs and their members. Clubs have an obligation under their Safety Management System to minimise the risk of fatigue, so far as is reasonably practicable. Individual members have a duty to take reasonable care for their own safety and health, and make sure their acts or omissions don?t adversely affect the health or safety of others. For further information on fatigue, refer to the Human Factors in Gliding publication. Towing with a Vehicle Drivers using a rigid bar must never tow at faster than walking pace and should always use the tow-out equipment designed for use with the glider. When towing gliders, never brake heavily and always allow a greater distance to slow or stop than the distance you would allow with only the car. Drivers and their passengers should always situationally aware and maintain a scanning technique.
Date: 5/3/2023
Region: VSA
Aircraft Type: DG1000
Classification Level 2: Weather
What Happened
While taking off from RWY 01 in a strong crosswind with a glider under tow, a strong gust from the left struck the combination just prior to the tug was becoming airborne. With the aircraft weight being mostly carried by the wings, the tug skidded sideways across the ground and then became airborne. The tug and glider proceeded to drift to the right and crossed the right-hand boundary fence at about 50ft. The combination climbed rapidly, and the glider released at 3000ft AGL about four minutes later.
Analysis
The towing combination comprised a DG-1000 glider being flown by a pre-solo student pilot under instruction and a Pawnee tow plane flown by a low hour?s tow pilot. A tow pilot who observed the take-off advised that the wind was 15kts, and probably gusting to 20 kts. The drift started just when the tug got light on the undercarriage, and about 5-10 seconds later the combination was climbing over the boundary fence. At that time, other gliders were landing on RWY 27, which was more into wind. As the tug started drifting to the right, the gliding instructor took control but elected to stay on tow as the as the combination had gained sufficient height and speed to clear the fence, and the instructor was concerned that had he released the rope may have struck the fence and potentially caused difficulties for the tow pilot. In hindsight, the instructor recognised that the flight should not have proceeded in the prevailing conditions, and that once the tug started to drift, he should have released and allowed the tug to safely climb away while landing the glider straight ahead on the runway. The Club CFI noted that the cause of this incident was most likely the result of a strong gust combined with incorrect inputs by the tow pilot, and it highlights why gliding duty crews must manage flight risks by moving operations to the most into wind runway in a timely manner.
Safety Advice
Like most clichés there is truth behind the statement that landings are mandatory, but take-offs are optional. Operations in crosswind conditions require strict adherence to applicable crosswind limitations or maximum recommended crosswind values, operational recommendations, and handling techniques. Most aeroplanes have a maximum demonstrated crosswind component. This is not a limitation?it is merely the greatest that was demonstrated during certification. If the pilot is very proficient, they may be able to take off (and land) with a greater crosswind. Also, while the aeroplane may be able to handle it?it?s the pilot that most often cannot. Pilots must therefore decide whether to attempt a crosswind take-off based on their recent experience and not some figure in the pilot?s operating handbook. In the case of an aerotow, it is the tow pilot that has this responsibility as pilot in command of the combination.
