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All clubs and GFA members are urged to report all occurrences and incidents promptly, as and when they occur, using the GFA’s occurrence reporting portal at glidingaustralia.org/Log-In/log-in-soar.html. This is always best done while all details are fresh in everyone's mind.
You can read the full SOAR report at tinyurl.com/ltmko56
Reports noted 'Under investigation' are based on preliminary information received and may contain errors. Any errors in this summary will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
7-November-2022 SAGA
Discus-2cT
Airspace Infringement
What Happened
While thermalling to gain height before embarking on a cross country flight, the pilot allowed the glider to drift into restricted airspace. The pilot had launched into a thermal north of the airfield and drifted south due to northerly wind. While conscious of the glider’s proximity to the airspace boundary to the south of the airfield, the pilot became focussed on finding the core of the thermal and did not realise the glider had penetrated restricted airspace by 1NM. Upon reaching 6000 ft, the pilot proceeded on the planned Cross-Country flight and only identified the airspace breach upon reviewing the flight trace at the end of the flight. The pilot immediately reported the infraction.
Analysis
The aerodrome from which the pilot was operating is situated beneath Class C airspace (LL4500), and within and between several areas of restricted military airspace and Danger Areas. The Club has access to some restricted airspace by arrangement with the RAAF. The Club CFI advised that the pilot has a good understanding of Airspace and is normally very diligent not to infringe airspace. However, on this occasion the pilot lost situational awareness of the glider’s proximity to the restricted airspace while focused on finding the core of the thermal. As a result, it didn’t take long before the glider drifted across the boundary. The CFI noted that the boundary is not well defined by ground features, and an analysis of the Club’s database of airspace infringements has identified this boundary as being a common area for airspace infringements. The club has increased pilot awareness of the issue and runs regular airspace workshops that are well attended.
Safety Advice
To avoid airspace infringements pilots should apply Threat and Error Management in their flight planning and flying (e.g., identify the threats such as airspace, weather and equipment). Pilots must also consider the errors they are likely to make, such as in navigation, and address them early. Particular attention should be paid to vertical limits of controlled airspace, and pilots should plan to remain 200’ below the base of controlled airspace and/or 1nm from the edge whenever possible. An approved and up-to-date moving map display in the field of vision is useful, and ensure you carry a backup, whether a current paper chart with the route drawn on or a second moving map display. It is also important that pilots understand the role of distraction before and during flight and how it can lead to inadvertent infringement of controlled airspace. Pilots should consciously recognise distractions including those from passengers, unfamiliar equipment or its malfunction, aircraft problems or weather as well as personal problems or stress. Pilots should ensure they positively shift attention from them back to flying, operating, and navigating the aircraft. If weather is becoming a factor, change your plans early and carefully. Importantly, look outside the cockpit with
9-Nov-2022 GQ
Astir CS
Aircraft Separation
Under investigation
A powered aircraft listed with RAAus and an Astir CS glider were involved in a mid-air collision appoximately 2NMs South-West of Gympie aerodrome at a height of about 2,500ft. Both aircraft spiralled to the ground and their pilots were fatally injured. The accident is being investigated by the Qld Police and Coroner.
19-Nov-2022 GQ
Piper PA-25-235
Aircraft Separation
What Happened
A glider and tug combination on departure from the aerodrome and climbing out in a left-hand turn towards the north-west came within 800 metres horizontally and 200ft vertically of a recently solo and low hours pilot flying to the south-west upwind of the operational runway.
Analysis
This incident occurred on a busy day, with the club conducting training and aerobatics for aviation students from the Griffith University Soaring Society using three two-seat gliders and two tow planes. There was also some cross-country flying being conducted by experienced pilots. Just after midday, the recently solo pilot was launched by aerotow in the DG1000 for a local flight. Shortly afterwards, the Duo Discus was launched for an aerobatic flight, and the tow pilot was flying to the designated aerobatic area. The pilot of the tug towing the DG1000 positioned the combination over directly over the runway instead of upwind, and the glider pilot released at 2000ft in the general area where the aerobatic flights were being conducted. The pilot of the second tow plane TOWING THE Duo Discus reported that “There were lots of gliders in the air and there was a lot of cumulus cloud, so whilst visibility generally was good, gliders were hard to pick up against the very white sky. All aircraft have Flarms.” The second tow pilot conducted a standard departure and while climbing through 2000ft towards the aerobatic area, the command pilot in the Duo Discus sighted the DG1000 flying directly towards the towing combination from about 30 degrees to the right. The tug pilot did not see the glider. The pilot of the Duo Discus immediately released and made a radio call “turn left, turn left, turn left”. The tow pilot recognised the glider pilot’s voice and at the same time saw the glider release in the mirror. The tow pilot immediately turned left and descended. The pilot of the DG1000 saw the two aircraft in front at this time and simultaneously the aircraft FLARM alerted. Neither the tug pilot nor the pilot of the Duo Discus recalled receiving a FLARM alert. All aircraft separated, but the solo pilot was unsure of what to do and appeared to have continued straight flight ahead.
Safety Action
Following the flight, the CFI, who was also the pilot of the second tug, conducted a debriefing with all parties involved. The following causal factors were identified:
l Ability to spot aircraft was impaired by significant cloud.
l The solo pilot lacked experience operating in a complex and dynamic airspace.
l There was a general lack of understanding about where the aerobatic manoeuvres were being conducted.
l The Flarms in the Duo discus and Tow Plane may not have been serviceable.
l The collision beacon in the nose of the DG1000 was not turned on.
The club has since taken the following remedial action:
l A safety presentation emphasising lookout was presented to members.
l Procedure were implemented for coordinated operations during training programs, including supervision of early solo pilots in this environment.
l Formal procedures were established for the conduct of aerobatic flights to avoid conflict with gliders and transiting powered aircraft.
l The nose beacon in the DG1000 is required to be turned on in flight to increase visibility.
l All Flarms were checked for serviceability.
27-Nov-2022 VSA
EON Olympia Mk 2b
Terrain Collisions
What Happened
The pilot released from tow at about 2000ft AGL and found strong sink. The pilot turned back towards the aerodrome but rapidly ran out of height. The pilot elected to make a straight-in approach to a paddock about 1 km from the aerodrome but on late finals observed a powerline ahead. The pilot turned right to land in another paddock, but the glider's wing hit the ground during the turn and the glider struck the ground while travelling sideways. The forward fuselage suffered substantial damage and the tailskid was torn off. The pilot was uninjured and was driven back to the aerodrome by the farmer.
Analysis
The elderly pilot had about 500 hours aeronautical experience, of which 300 hours and 150 flights were in sailplanes. He had not flown for more than 12 months and completed six flights with the CFI as part of his Flight Review in the week preceding the accident. On the accident flight the pilot was flying a vintage Olympia sailplane that he had owned for several years and recently sold. The pilot’s experience on type was not provided. The pilot reported that after releasing from tow the glider encountered heavy sink and despite heading straight back to the aerodrome the glider did not fly into any lift. The pilot believed paddocks around the aerodrome were landable, so he continued to push on rather than select a closer paddock and conduct a circuit. On late final the pilot observed a powerline across the approach, and while manoeuvring at low level to land in another paddock the glider’s wing struck the ground. The glider slewed sideways and landed heavily and was substantially damage. The pilot was uninjured. The reason for the high sink rate was not established, and the glider’s airbrakes may have been extended for the flight.
Safety Advice - Outlanding
Accidents during outlanding are often due to not having enough time to thoroughly inspect and choose a field and plan the landing. The trap is when you keep hoping that you will find a thermal so you delay making the decision to land. Unlike landing at the home airfield where the runway layout, ground features and hazards are usually well known, when landing in a strange paddock the pilot is faced with the unknown. Such a situation demands the pilot take additional precautions to ensure a proper survey is undertaken of the landing area so as to identify all hazards and ensure a safe approach and landing can be accomplished. Pilots must adhere to their training, which requires the conduct of a proper circuit of the landing area to review for suitability.
Currency and Aging
It is well known that flight experience can compensate to some degree for age-related declines in cognitive function and that overlearned complex tasks such as piloting are less susceptible to age-related deterioration than abilities to perform in novel situations. Notwithstanding, recency of experience can have a dramatic effect on overall airmanship, regardless of age. It is known that older pilots who have long breaks between flying take longer to regain their proficiency. Older pilots should fly regularly and participate more frequently in recurrent training. Unfortunately in this case, the recent flight review was not sufficient to prevent this accident from happening.
29-Nov-2022 VSA
Piper PA-25-235/A1
Aircraft Control
What Happened
During the third aerotow for the day and at approximately 50ft AGL, the tug commenced an uncommanded rapid roll to the right resulting in the tug turning sharply to the right. The tug pilot released the tow rope and initiated an unusual attitude recovery. The glider pilot simultaneously released the tow rope and landed straight ahead. The tow pilot flew a modified circuit and landed.
Analysis
The launch was being conducted without the assistance of a wingtip runner, so the glider was taking off from a wing down position. The slack in the rope was taken up uneventfully and the combination became airborne. The tow pilot reported that shortly after becoming airborne and at a height of about 50ft, the tug “…went from straight and level to nearly 90 degrees within less than a second”. The pilot attempted to reduce power but inadvertently pulled the mixture control. Observing the glider passing on the left, the tow pilot pulled the release, and then applied full power to climb away. The glider pilot also released from tow and landed heavily straight ahead. The tow pilot completed a modified circuit and landed safely. The tug was inspected by a LAME and no issues or defects were identified. The glider was undamaged. The trace from the tug’s Flarm unit verified the pilot had sufficient airspeed at the time of the upset. The Club Tugmaster believes the occurrence was consistent with the tug having been caught by a thermal gust.
2-Dec-2022 NSWGA
DG-808 C
Aircraft Separation
Under investigation
Two gliders nearly collided in the circuit while landing on different runways. A DG 800 was on final approach to RWY 18 and a SZD 55 was in a left-hand circuit to RWY 09. The SZD 55 passed directly underneath the DG 800 with abut 60 feet vertical separation. The pilot of the SZD 55 did not see the DG 808 and was unaware of the incident until debriefed afterwards. The pilot of the DG 800 observed the SZD 55 low on the left and passing underneath and had no time to take avoiding action. Analysis of the flight traces revealed that both gliders had passed in opposing directions about 1 minute earlier when the DG 800 was on base leg to RWY18 and the SZD 55 was positioning to join downwind to RWY 09 in left-hand turn. At that time the gliders passed within 130 metres horizontal separation and 151 feet vertical separation. Neither pilot could recall receiving a Flarm alert of the near collision. Both pilots heard each other’s circuit calls, but the pilot of the SZD 55 was confused by the DG 800 pilot’s circuit call due to the expectation they would be landing on the common runway being used for landing on the day. The pilot of the SZD 55 was undertaking their first flight in type.
8-Dec-2022 NSWGA
Sparrow Hawk
Terrain Collisions
Under investigation
During the initial stages of an aerotow launch, and shortly after the glider became airborne, witnesses observed the glider move into the high tow position and, when at a height of about 50ft AGL, the glider was observed to suddenly pitch up steeply to the right, and then the left wing and nose dropped. One witness observed the tow rope was still attached as the glider pitched down but believed the pilot must have activated the tow release because the tow plane climbed away while the glider departed controlled flight. As the glider’s left wing dropped, the wingtip struck the ground followed by the fuselage striking the ground in a nose down attitude while pivoting around the wingtip. The glider was substantially damaged, and the pilot suffered serious injury. Police and emergency services attended, and the pilot was transported to hospital by ambulance. The pilot has no recollection of the launch or accident.
15-Dec-2022 NSWGA
Standard Cirrus
Aircraft Control
What Happened
During a competition flight the pilot conducted a straight-in approach from the control point approximately 10km from the finish circle. The pilot omitted to configure the aircraft for landing by lowering the undercarriage and did not complete the pre-landing checklist before landing.
Analysis
The pilot stated that he had earlier recovered from two potential outlandings and he may have been fatigued. Additionally, the pilot did not carry sufficient drinking water for the flight and may have also been dehydrated. The pilot also noted the undercarriage lever on the aircraft being flown acted opposite to what he was accustomed. Discussion with the CFI highlighted the importance of maintaining appropriate consideration of human factors in relation to the effects of dehydration, appropriate infight hydration, sustenance, urination, the cumulative effects of fatigue following multiple days of flying, including in hot conditions.
Safety Advice
Straight-in approaches are now commonly used to simplify the final approach under competition conditions. While they require more experience and energy management, they avoid complexity and exposure to collision risk. However, the chances of identifying an error while flying a normal, standard circuit is significantly higher than when on final glide for a straight-in approach. The absence of a base leg (particularly) but also of a downwind leg also reduces the opportunity to examine the landing area and final approach. Notwithstanding, none of this does more than add to workload and this procedure is, on balance, safer for experienced pilots. Despite this, landing mishaps still occur during a straight-in approach due to poor workload management, so pilots must take care to ensure that the pre-landing checklist is carried out. For further information, refer to OSB 01/14 'Circuit and Landing
17-Dec-2022 GQ
Cessna 150G
Aircraft Control
Under investigation
As the glider/tow aircraft combination was passing about 1500 feet, the tow aircraft received a drastic load pulling the tail to the left. The tow pilot checked the rear vision mirror and noted the glider in a position well to the left of the tow aircraft. As the tow pilot watched, the glider commenced a correctional turn to the right but at such a speed that the tow pilot became alarmed and decided to release the tow rope from the tow aircraft.
17-Dec-2022 WAGA
SZD-48-1 Jantar Standard 2
Preparation/Navigation
What Happened
During an aerotow launch, the glider pilot noticed a vibration at approximately 300 feet AGL and observed that the airbrakes were open. He promptly closed them and the flight continued.
Analysis
The pilot is very experienced and was carrying out his third flight for the season. At the time he thought he had an adequate time to conduct all his checks as the tug had just taken off. However, he did not realise that the second tug had started and was positioning in front ready for the tow, which caused him to rush through his checks to avoid holding up others awaiting to fly. Although he thought he had checked the airbrake, they were not locked. On review there did not seem to be a safety issue regarding the climb as the tug pilot did not notice any decrease in performance.
Safety Advice
Pilots must remain alert to the risks of rushing through checklists, as vital procedures can easily be missed. Checklists enhance flight safety and enable the pilot to confirm safety critical systems and controls are correctly and consistently configured for a phase of flight. Distractions, interruptions, and haste result in a disruption of the sequential flow of the checklist. One technique to counter distractions and interruptions is to repeat the entire checklist (starting from the beginning) during these situations. Unfortunately, if the pilot is in a hurry, this will likely not be done.
17-Dec-2022 VSA
Twin Astir
Aircraft Separation
What Happened
A winch launch was abandoned just before the launch commands were given as a powered aircraft flew over the runway at a height where conflict was likely. No radio calls were heard from the aircraft, that had departed a nearby certified aerodrome.
Analysis
A two-seat glider was about to be launched on a training flight when the launch crewman heard and then saw an aeroplane about to overfly the duty runway at a height that would likely conflict with the launch. The ground crewman immediately called “stop, stop, stop” to the member in the control van, who relayed the message to the winch driver. The launch did not proceed. Neither the ground nor flight crew heard a radio call from the aircraft to indicate a possible overfly of the glider field. The ground crewman made a broadcast to the aircraft overflying to the effect that it was overflying an active winch launching glider field but did not receive a response. The identity of the overflying aircraft could not be ascertained.
Safety Advice
The potential for conflict with transiting aircraft overflying operational winch sites is real, and there have been several close calls over recent years. It will be obvious to all that it is essential for pilots preparing to launch to be aware of any airspace activities in their vicinity and the threat, if any, posed by the presence of other aircraft. Lookout is the principal method for implementing see-and-avoid. Effective lookout means seeing what is 'out there' and assessing the information that is received before making an appropriate decision. The primary tool of alerted see-and-avoid that is common across aviation is the radio. Radio allows for the communication of information to the pilot from the ground or from other aircraft. Radio is also useful for the wing runner, to aid in situational awareness or monitoring of gliders or aircraft that might affect the launch operation. A radio announcement prior to each and every launch is a standard operating procedure at all gliding sites and is expected by other operators. With winch launching operations, Gliding Australia now requires all launch commands, including the ‘take-up slack’ and ‘all out’ commands, be given on the CTAF or local aerodrome frequency. These additional calls improve situational awareness for pilots flying in the area and are known to have been responsible for reducing conflict with transiting powered traffic at, at least, two winch sites in Australia. In this case the above requirements for ensuring the airspace was clear for launch was clearly understood by duty crew on the day, and their alertness prevented a potential accident.
26-Dec-2022 NSWGA
Discus-2b
Terrain Collisions
Under investigation
During a cross-country flight the pilot flew across unlandable terrain in search of lift marked by clouds. When the pilot arrived under the clouds, he was unable to find lift, and the glider became too low to fly to suitable landing areas. While attempting to land on a highway, the glider undershot and crash into scrubland. The glider was substantially damaged but the pilot was uninjured.
All clubs and GFA members are urged to report all occurrences and incidents promptly, as and when they occur, using the GFA’s occurrence reporting portal at glidingaustralia.org/Log-In/log-in-soar.html. This is always best done while all details are fresh in everyone's mind.
You can read the full SOAR report at tinyurl.com/ltmko56
Reports noted 'Under investigation' are based on preliminary information received and may contain errors. Any errors in this summary will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
Occurrences & Incidents May - August 2021
All clubs and GFA members are urged to report all occurrences and incidents promptly, as and when they occur, using the GFA’s occurrence reporting portal at glidingaustralia.org/Log-In/log-in-soar.html. This is always best done while all details are fresh in everyone's mind.
You can read the full SOAR report at tinyurl.com/ltmko56
Reports noted 'Under investigation' are based on preliminary information received and may contain errors. Any errors in this summary will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
1-May-2022 waga
DG-500 Elan Orion
Preparation/Navigation
What Happened
During an aerotow launch the tow pilot noticed that the combination was not climbing normally. After checking the tow plane, and at approximately 2,000 ft AGL, the tow pilot gave a ‘rudder waggle’ signal to alert the glider pilot to the poor climb rate. When the glider pilot did not respond to the signal, the tow pilot check is rear-view mirror and observed sunlight reflecting off the open [aluminium] dive brake panels. The tow pilot then called the glider pilot on the CTAF frequency and informed the pilot the glider’s airbrakes were open, and after several seconds of inaction the tow pilot made another call. The glider pilot then closed and locked the airbrakes and replied to the tow pilot over the radio. The launch and release proceeded normally thereafter.
Analysis
The glider pilot had conducted nine flights since the beginning of 2022, four of which were in his own glider (Hornet), and three of were private passenger flights in the club's Puchaczs. The pilot had not flown the DG505 since September 2021. The CFI spoke to the pilot about the occurrence and it was determined that the pilot did not correctly lock the dive brake prior to the launch. It was not determined why the glider pilot did not notice the wing waggle or hear the intial radio calls. The pilot stated they had cycled through opening and closing the airbrakes during the pr-take-off checks, and when challenged by the launch crew the pilot stated they “touched the dive brake handle to ensure it was fully forward and checked the handle was flush with the cockpit wall and said ‘dive brakes locked and away’. The pilot noted that unfamiliarity on type may have contributed: “the airbrake handle on the DG 505 is apparently in the ‘locked position’ the handle is flush with the wall of the cockpit when the brakes are not locked”, whereas on “other gliders I fly the airbrake handle is not flush with the cockpit wall until it is locked away.” The glider pilot agreed to attend additional training with one of the club's Level 3 instructors before flying the DG505 again. The CFI wrote an article for the club's monthly newsletter, reminding pilots to physically check that the dive brakes are properly locked when performing the pre-take-off checks.
Safety Advice
Unfamiliarity with type is most likely to cause problems during high workload situations. It is therefore importance that pilots understand that ‘new’ gliders take time to get to know. Sometimes differences can be minor, and familiarity comes easily. However, even simple processes, like locking the airbrakes, can be different between types. It is therefore important that pilots take the time to know and fully understand the function and location of all the controls and systems.
1-May-2022 WAGA
DG-500 Elan Orion
Aircraft Control
What Happened
The pilot was conducting a local private passenger flight, and had returned to the circuit after a flight of about 2 hours duration. During the final approach the pilot flared early, and the glider stalled onto the runway from about 1 metre. The tailwheel struck the runway first and just ahead of the mainwheel. The landing was observed by the Duty Instructor and several other pilots, who described the landing as being "heavy". The duty instructor, who is also Airworthiness inspector, noted that the glider ran out of energy while the main wheel was approximately one metre above the ground but it did not sustain any damage. The pilot believed they had too much airbrake applied after the flare, but the duty instructor was of the view that the round-out was started too high. The CFI has briefed one of the club's Level 3 instructors, who has agreed to spend some time with the pilot to assist with improving their landing technique and other aspects of their flying. It was noted by the CFI that while the pilot was current, they had only a few flights on type and had not flown this aircraft for several months.
8-May-2022 SAGA
DG-500 Elan Orion
Aircraft Control
What Happened
During the initial ground roll of an aerotow launch being flown by the student pilot, the starboard wing dropped to the ground. The flight crew heard a noticeable ‘bang’ as the wingtip struck the edge of a taxiway. The student then experienced problems controlling the aircraft, so the instructor assumed control. The flight continued with no further issues, but after landing the instructor noticed damage to, and excessive movement in, the winglet. The glider was grounded pending a detailed structural inspection.
Analysis
At this regional aerodrome it is usual for gliders to launch from the right-hand side of runway 31 on the 4m wide bitumen edge of the main unsealed runway. During launch the glider’s right wing overhangs the edge of the runway, and the take-off path crosses a taxiway to the north of RWY 05/23. The CFI reported that the soil around the bitumen moves due to changing moisture content, and at the time of this incident the soil was about a 20 to 30mm below the level of the bitumen. When the wing dropped to the ground, the wingtip wheel holder struck the edge of the bitumen and compressed against the wheel, and the shock caused the wingtip to flex that damaged the wingtip retaining pin. The bent retaining pin prevented the wing tip extension from easily being removed, but upon inspection it was revealed that the alignment pins and stub spar were undamaged. The level change along the edge of the runway and taxiways is a known issue, and the airfield maintenance team are constantly filling the areas and rolling the surface to keep the level change as small as possible. The CFI stated: “The key learning from this issue is the damage to the wingtip extension, was not obvious at first glance. The fact the force of the impact was sufficient to bend the wingtip wheel mounting frame indicated that further investigation was needed before returning the aircraft to the flight line.”
Safety Advice
A damaged wingtip security mechanism can lead to the winglet dislodging in flight, as SOAR report S-1600 attests. On 15 November 2019 at about 2000ft AGL, the wingtip securing mechanism of a Lak 17 sailplane failed, allowing the winglet to move forward and dislodge from the alignment pins. The winglet twisted in the airflow causing the aircraft to enter a spin that was not recoverable. The pilot only just managed to escape by parachute. Any significant wingtip strike during launch in an aircraft with detachable winglets should be treated seriously and whenever possible the flight should be abandoned. The aircraft should be thoroughly inspected by an approved inspector before being returned to service.
8-May-2022 NSWGA
FK Lightplanes FK9 Mk IV ELA
Runway Events
What Happened
A powered aircraft entered the runway and took off while the runway was occupied by a glider and tug preparing to launch.
Analysis
Operations at this regional aerodrome have been limited to a single runway (runway 05/23) for several months while runway 18/36 is reconstructed. The reconstruction has also closed the cross runway 09/27. Runway 05/23 is an asphalt surface 30 metres wide and 2040 metres long. When conditions are suitable, glider operations from taxiway B on runway 05/23 are common practice given that taxiway B is midway along the runway. Operating in this manner minimises the duration of runway occupation with the glider next to launch able to prepare outside of the runway strip, and the tow plane is able to land short and, where no aircraft are wishing to use the runway, roll through to conduct the next launch with minimal delay and impact on other users. Taxiway B has clear visibility to both the 05 and 23 thresholds and vice versa. On the day of the incident, and prior to the powered aircraft entering the runway, the glider ground crew made an entering runway call on the CTAF for an imminent glider launch. The glider was then pushed from the holding point at the runway strip edge onto runway 23 at taxiway B (mid runway taxiway). As the glider was turned and aligned on the runway centreline a powered aircraft called on the CTAF that it was also entering runway 23. The glider ground crew called the powered aircraft and confirmed that the glider was on the runway and would be launching in approximately 2 minutes. The powered aircraft was visible at the runway threshold from the glider launch point. The powered aircraft acknowledged and responded that it would be “out of the way”. As the ground crew removed the glider tail dolly and prepared the aerotow rope, the powered aircraft took off and overflew the glider/tug combination by an estimated 100-150 feet. During the subsequent investigation, the pilot of the powered aircraft stated that he knew the gliders were operating from about the mid length of runway 23. He advised that after broadcasting he was entering the operational runway from the threshold, about 1,000 metres behind the glider operation), he received a radio call from the gliding operation advising they would be taking off in about three minutes. The pilot of the powered aircraft could see the tug and glider, but due to the distance he believed they were positioned outside the runway and that he could take-off and be out of the way without interfering with the glider launch. As his aircraft is a taildragger the pilot did not see the gliding combination over the nose until he was airborne, at which point he judged the safest course was to continue the take-off. The pilot of the powered aircraft was surprised to see the glider was on the runway and not the grass. The gliding CFI advised that the position of the gliding operation was agreed by the aerodrome operations panel and local operators are aware. However, consideration will be given to including an entry in ERSA or issuing a NOTAM for the period the runway works are in progress.
Safety Advice
This incident highlights the hazard of non-standard operations, i.e. gliders operating from mid runway and at some distance from the threshold, and the critical importance of communications, especially what you say and how you say it. For further information on good communication, refer to the fourth booklet in the revised 'Safety behaviours: human factors for pilots’ kit available from the CASA website: https://bit.ly/3gCsl0U
NOTE: When the runway strip is occupied by a glider tug or glider, the runway is deemed to be occupied. Aircraft using the runway may, however, commence their take-off run from a position ahead of a stationary glider or tug aircraft (Chapter 3 of the CASA Visual Flight Rules Guide and AIP ENR 5.5-2, paragraph 1.2.4 refer). Also, Pilots must comply with CASR 91.055 – ‘(Aircraft not to be operated in manner that creates a hazard’.
21-May-2022 NSWGA
Astir CS
Landing
gear/Indication
What Happened
Following a winch launch to about 1600ft AGL, the pilot retracted the undercarriage and flew towards a nearby ridge. After several minutes ridge soaring, the pilot returned to the circuit. While configuring the aircraft for landing the pilot found the undercarriage handle was jammed and could not be moved despite several attempts. The pilot made a radio call informing the ground crew of the problem and conducted a safe landing with the undercarriage retracted. The aircraft suffered only minor abrasions to the bottom of the fuselage. Inspection identified the rear edge of the mudguard (which is part of the undercarriage system) had latched onto a lapped joint in the wheel bay liner. This is a known issue with this type and is usually the result of the pilot raising the undercarriage with excessive force. The proposed solution is to add about 10mm to the leading edge of the aft section of liner to ensure the overlap is always maintained.
22-May-2022 SAGA
ask21
Aircraft Control
What Happened
The elderly pilot, who had been driving the winch all day, decided the fly the glider back to the hangar at the end of flying operations. During final approach the pilot increased airspeed to 80 knots and flew along the length of the runway at between 10 to 15 feet. Towards the end of the strip run and while the glider was still flying at 70 knots, the plot opened the airbrakes slightly. While the pilot was prepared for a change in pitch, the glider immediately dropped, and the mainwheel struck the runway at speed. The glider rebounded, touched down again and the pilot held the glider in the flare attitude. The glider then touched down heavily and rolled to a stop within about 70 meters. The glider was withdrawn from service pending a hard landing inspection.
Analysis
The CFI found that mishandled recovery from the initial bounce led to pilot-induced oscillations, with around 4-5 touchdowns occurring. The Club’s Instructors’ Panel observed that the pilot’s skill set is gradually declining with age, and that the pilot was well behind the action during the bounced landing. The pilot has accepted this observation and will participate in some remedial training and more frequent check flights. It is unlikely the pilot will attempt another ground-effect run.
Safety Advice
As we grow older our body has a tendency to "slow down" in reaction time, and our cognitive abilities also decline with aging of brain cells and their billions of complex interconnections. Every day we perform hundreds of cognitive tasks but are mostly unaware of the effort involved. Cognitive deficiencies are insidious, have a substantial negative impact on performance and are hardest to identify when the pilot is performing routine activities. One reason symptoms go unnoticed is that with practice and routine, the brain adjusts to mild to moderate cognitive impairment. In other words, normal activities can mask the severity of the deficiency. However, if the pilot’s routine is interrupted by an urgent or stressful situation, then the extent of cognitive impairment may become more evident. It is well known that flight experience can compensate to some degree for age-related declines in cognitive function and that overlearned complex tasks such as piloting are less susceptible to age-related deterioration than abilities to perform in novel situations. Notwithstanding, recency of experience can have a dramatic effect on overall airmanship, regardless of age. It is known that older pilots who have long breaks between flying take longer to regain their proficiency. Older pilots should fly regularly and participate more frequently in recurrent training (e.g., flight reviews). However, when physical deterioration outstrips piloting skills - it's time to quit!
12-Jun-2022 GQ
SZD-50-3 Puchacz
Terrain Collisions
What Happened
During the final approach the student mishandled the flare and recovery, and the instructor was too late in taking over and could not prevent the left wing from contacting the ground heavily and then impacting a runway light. The glider’s port wingtip was substantially damaged.
Analysis
The pre-solo student was undertaking the first of four planned pre-solo assessment flights. The student performed well during the launch and brief soaring flight and flew a normal circuit. The student established the glider on a stabilised final approach using a half-airbrake setting. In response to overshooting the aiming point the student opened the air brakes further, which resulted in a high rate of descent. The student over rotated into the flare and the glider ballooned. The student corrected by closing the airbrakes and pitching forward on the stick, and then opened the airbrakes again. The instructor called taking over but this was not heard by the student who remained on the controls. The instructor found the controls were difficult to move and could not prevent the left wing striking the ground heavily and then colliding with a runway light. The student had not flown for two months and the instructor, with hindsight, recognised that they should have given the student more time to refamiliarise themselves before introducing the pressure of an assessment flight.
Safety Advice
The most common instructing accident is 'instructor failed to take-over in time'. These accidents usually involve the trainee responding in an unforeseen way or failing to respond at all (e.g. not rounding out). Given that the overall idea is to let the trainee do as much as possible within their level of skill the instructor should never wait until the last moment - which can rapidly become too late before responding to a situation that is going awry. This is particularly true of any manoeuvres close to the ground. Instructors also need to guard themselves against unexpected reactions during the critical stages of flight by adopting a defensive posture, i.e. having their hands and feet ready to take control.
23-Jun-2022 NSWGA
HK 36 R
Runway incursion
What Happened
While a motor glider was on final approach to RWY 36, the Duty Instructor observed two persons walking down the middle of the runway towards the launch point. The Duty Instructor made a radio call to inform the motor glider pilot of the runway incursion and suggested he land on RWY 35. The motor glider pilot diverted onto runway 35 and landed without further incident.
Analysis
The motor glider pilot was flying a glider approach and not under power. The pedestrians were a visiting level 2 instructor and former club member, and an ab-initio student. The instructor had landed earlier after a very brief solo flight and decided to walk back to the launch point after leaving the aircraft at the hanger complex. The Duty Instructor noted the pedestrians when difficult to see in the late afternoon lighting conditions as their clothing blended into the surrounding grass and trees. The motor glider pilot stated that he did not see the pedestrians during the approach for the same reasons, and that he may not have seen them at all had the Duty instructor not made the radio call. The motor glider pilot stated the pedestrians were directly in his approach path and he very easily could have hit them. The visiting instructor admitted he was not paying attention and did not consider the dangers of walking down the middle of an active runway, nor the issue of visibility late in the afternoon. The ab-initio student stated he was unaware of the approaching motor glider, that he was following the lead of the instructor, and had not thought of the dangers of walking in the middle of an active runway. The pedestrians were counselled and all personnel on the airfield were reminded of the dangers of being on an active runway, and of the expectation that all personnel returning to the launch point must use the adjacent dirt road.
Safety Advice
A runway incursion happens when an aircraft comes close to collision with another aircraft, vehicle, or person within the take-off and landing area. In most cases, runway incursions happen due to human errors. In this case, the pedestrians’ lack of situational awareness and failure to recognise the risks of walking down the middle of an operational runway were the key causal factors. Situational awareness is the understanding of your environment, which involves information processing and sound decision-making. No one has perfect situational awareness, but it is vital that one thinks ahead, and monitors, detects and recognises those factors that pose a risk. Above all, avoid complacency.
10-Jul-2022 NSWGA
ASK 21 Mi
Birdstrike
What Happened
At about 500 ft on climb out, the pilot of the glider under tow observed an eagle fly straight towards the tug. The tug pilot saw the bird approaching and made a sharp left turn. The bird passed the tug but was caught in the slipstream. The glider pilot reported “an uncontrolled rotating ball of feathers came straight at the glider hitting the port wing about five feet out from the fuselage. I requested a right turn back towards the airfield and released for a straight in landing on RWY 03”. After landing a maintenance inspector examined the port wing and found the bird had struck the top of the leading edge and slid over the wing leaving scratches and slight residue, but there was no structural damage, and the aircraft was returned to service.